

RETURN TO CIA  
Background Use Only  
Do Not Release

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE		TOTAL COPIES 3	RI <input type="checkbox"/> COPY <input type="checkbox"/> DUMMY
SECRET		REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED	
FROM	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		1 3 1 5
ACTION	ADVANCE COPY		2 3 1 5
INFO	ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> BY <input type="checkbox"/> DATED <input type="checkbox"/> THRU <input type="checkbox"/>		3 4 1 5
1. 11/1/54 2. 11/1/54 3. 11/1/54 4. 11/1/54 5. 11/1/54 6. 11/1/54 7. 11/1/54 8. 11/1/54 9. 11/1/54 10. 11/1/54 11. 11/1/54 12. 11/1/54 13. 11/1/54 14. 11/1/54 15. 11/1/54 16. 11/1/54 17. 11/1/54 18. 11/1/54 19. 11/1/54 20. 11/1/54 21. 11/1/54 22. 11/1/54 23. 11/1/54 24. 11/1/54 25. 11/1/54 26. 11/1/54 27. 11/1/54 28. 11/1/54 29. 11/1/54 30. 11/1/54 31. 11/1/54 32. 11/1/54 33. 11/1/54 34. 11/1/54 35. 11/1/54 36. 11/1/54 37. 11/1/54 38. 11/1/54 39. 11/1/54 40. 11/1/54 41. 11/1/54 42. 11/1/54 43. 11/1/54 44. 11/1/54 45. 11/1/54 46. 11/1/54 47. 11/1/54 48. 11/1/54 49. 11/1/54 50. 11/1/54 51. 11/1/54 52. 11/1/54 53. 11/1/54 54. 11/1/54 55. 11/1/54 56. 11/1/54 57. 11/1/54 58. 11/1/54 59. 11/1/54 60. 11/1/54 61. 11/1/54 62. 11/1/54 63. 11/1/54 64. 11/1/54 65. 11/1/54 66. 11/1/54 67. 11/1/54 68. 11/1/54 69. 11/1/54 70. 11/1/54 71. 11/1/54 72. 11/1/54 73. 11/1/54 74. 11/1/54 75. 11/1/54 76. 11/1/54 77. 11/1/54 78. 11/1/54 79. 11/1/54 80. 11/1/54 81. 11/1/54 82. 11/1/54 83. 11/1/54 84. 11/1/54 85. 11/1/54 86. 11/1/54 87. 11/1/54 88. 11/1/54 89. 11/1/54 90. 11/1/54 91. 11/1/54 92. 11/1/54 93. 11/1/54 94. 11/1/54 95. 11/1/54 96. 11/1/54 97. 11/1/54 98. 11/1/54 99. 11/1/54 100. 11/1/54			

SECRET 302217Z

DIR CITE SALV 5312

DYVOUR PERUMEN AMNUG

30 SEP 64 IN 84511

REFS A. SALV 5313 (IN 83009) &amp;

B. DIR 53323

1. LAMROSC AND AMNUG 1, ONCE EACH ALONE AND ONCE TOGETHER SAW <sup>02</sup>JUNAVE 1 MORNING 30 SEPTEMBER. <sup>02</sup>JUNAVE 1 TOOK SAME POSITION AS PARA 2 REF A. DENIED KNOWING AMNUG DESPITE CASE OFFICER RELATIONSHIP, REFUSED DISCUSS ANYTHING ABOUT CUBAN INTEL, AND BEGGED FOR RELEASE AND EXILE TO START LIFE ANEW.

2. OBTAINING TRUTH FROM <sup>02</sup>JUNAVE 1 WILL BE TIME CONSUMING. HE FULLY AWARE PROOFS AGAINST HIM BUT PROBABLY HOPES POLITICAL PRESSURE WILL FORCE RELEASE AND PROBABLY FEARS ADMISSION OF HIS COMPLICITY WILL NOT HELP HIM. SALV GOVT MUST CONVINCE HIM HE WRONG ON BOTH COUNTS. HE OF DUBIOUS VALUE INSOFAR AS CONTRIBUTING NEW INFO ABOUT PAST ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN INTEL OR PCES BUT OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AS AGENT IF HE CAN BE TARGETTED AGAINST CUBAN INTEL OR PCES. IF RELEASED WOULD BE DEFINITE OBSTACLE TO FURTHER OPS AGAINST AMNUG TARGETS. IF HE SHOULD BE DOUBLED, HIS IMPRISONMENT WOULD COVER RECRUITMENT AND WOULD TEND TO ENHANCE HIS VALUE. PROBABLY WOULD BE MOST USEFUL OUTSIDE SALV INCLUDING MEXI AND CUBA.

SECRET

3182

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

IN PAGE

3. AS MATTERS STAND MOST IMPORTANT TO PROTECT KUDARK EQUITY IN

02 [JUNAVE 2] WHO OF GREAT PROMISE. THIS CP COULD BE AFFECTED ADVERSELY BY SPREAD OF NEWS ABOUT ARMS EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF KUDARK TO EFFECT RECRUITMENTS. BECAUSE OF VALUE OF [JUNAVE 2] 02 PREFER FOR PRESENT NOT TO PROCEED AGAINST OTHERS WHO RECEIVED INTEL TRAINING. AFTER [JUNAVE 2] 02 IS PRODUCING AND AFTER PRESENT INTERVAL KUDARK CAN PROCEED WITH RECRUITMENT EFFORTS 24 AGAINST OTHERS EITHER UNILATERALLY OR WITH [LIAISON] 24 DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS.

4. PROCEEDING WITH ARREST OF GUERRILLEROS TRAINED IN CUBA PROBABLY WOULD BE BENEFICIAL AS LONG AS NOT ATTRIBUTED TO ARMS. IN ADDITION TO BENEFITS OF CA PLAY, SOME OF THOSE DETAINED MIGHT BE DOUBLED AND TARGETED AGAINST GUERRILLA GROUPS OR POPS.

5. APPRECIATE REF B TO WHICH WILL REPLY AFTER DISSEMINATING FURTHER PROSPECTS AND GOVT INTENTIONS WITH [JUNAVE 1] AND POSSIBLY PRESIDENT. 01, 08

SECRET

01  
\* [JUNAVE 1] 01 AGREED WITH [JUNAVE 1] 01  
WHICH WHEN LAINGOSCH MEETS [JUNAVE 1] 02

SECRET

7/15/2